INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
Appropriate job±worker matching occurs to the extent that the parties' relevant characteristics are common knowledge, that is, if the existing economic institutions allow for full screening and signaling before the transaction takes place. Interviews and tests are screening devices, whereas the veri®able items in an applicant's CV are signals. Firms can also signal job characteristics through ads, size, employees, and reputation. Despite these instruments, in practice a ®rm's information about jobrelevant characteristics of its applicants is never perfect, and a worker is never certain as to the attributes of the jobs he/she is offered. The matching problem is therefore a potential source of economy-wide inef®ciency.
This article concentrates on one instrument, the offer wage, and investigates its impact on matching ef®ciency. What signaling and/or screening functions can wage offers perform when nonwage instruments are not available or only partially succeed in transmitting the relevant information?
2 This question is addressed in a matching model of a large job market populated by observationally indistinguishable, heterogeneous ®rms and workers. Heterogeneity is introduced in the simplest way, by assuming two basic types of ®rms and workers, where one type has an advantage over the other: ®rms prefer good-quality workers and workers prefer ®rms with better attributes, wages being equal. However, good-quality workers are much more productive in ®rms with better attributes; hence, ef®ciency requires ®rms and workers of the same type be matched. The approach in this article differs in that the process of matching is explicitly modeled as a noncooperative game where ®rms offer wages and workers respond with their application decisions. The matching probability at a given wage offer is obtained endogenously, as a feature of the equilibrium outcome. 3 This simple model generates a rich class of predictions in the form of matching equilibria, relating wage offers and matching ef®ciency to the distribution of unobservable characteristics: if the proportion of``good'' ®rms to``bad'' workers is large, perfect matching occurs through wage offers that do both signaling and screening. In another equilibrium, wages signal ®rm types but do only partial screening if the good-worker population is suf®ciently large. Both ®rm types offer the same wage in equilibrium if the market is predominantly populated by good workers and good ®rms. Other equilibria exhibit Gresham's Law in the job market: pessimistic workers and ®rms of the good type withdraw and take their outside options. Because search is assumed to be costless, any inef®ciency of the matching equilibrium outcome is due solely to the two-sided information problem.
Below, I brie¯y relate the article's predictions to the literature and relegate a more detailed discussion to Section 4. The wage determination literature provides a number of theories explaining observed wage patterns, sources of inter-and intraindustry wage differentials, sizes of compensating differentials and instances where they are paid, and why wages may exceed workers' opportunity costs. The implications derived in this article complement existing explanations for the above phenomena, some of which are termed``anomalies. '' 4 Because the model is a one-shot matching game, these implications should be relevant especially in the short run.
Ef®ciency wage and agency models of employment relationships show that paying more than the apparent going wage may deliver a net productivity gain.
5 Such a strategy can also sort workers into ®rms that have differential observed compensations. 6 The explanation in this article is based on unobservable characteristics: the motive of signaling unobserved ®rm attributes alone can generate a wage differential. This equilibrium outcome arises if the population of good-quality workers is relatively large, that is, if a desirable ®rm attribute can be signaled through a wage differential at a reasonable cost. The signaling motive is a plausible explanation for many observed intraindustry wage differentials, such as the substantial annual wage differential an MBA graduate may receive from two similar jobs in the same city (which is reported in Thaler, 1989) .
Compensating differentials play an important role in wage determination when jobs differ with respect to observable attributes. The theory (see Rosen, 1986) stipulates premia should be paid according to the perceived dif®culty of the job, but there seems no reason why such premia should be paid when workers and jobs are observationally indistinguishable. I show that the prediction of the theory of compensating differentials continues to hold under two-sided incomplete information provided that the market is largely populated by``good'' jobs and``bad'' workers. A matching equilibrium exists in which wage offers perform full signaling and screening: jobs with undesirable attributes pay a premium, matching``good'' ®rms and workers at a lower wage than``bad'' ®rms and workers.
7 This is the only outcome that ef®cient labor allocation obtains in the present model. The predictions summarized above suggest that the motive of signaling job attributes or screening for worker characteristics through wage offers has the potential of explaining a variety of short-run wage patterns in markets where agents' characteristics are not fully observable.
The article is organized as follows: The next section describes the matching model and its equilibrium concept. Section 3 presents the equilibrium outcomes and Section 4 provides a summary and discussion of results. All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
THE MODEL THE MODEL
Consider a sector of the economy with large populations of ®rms and workers, of measure M and N, respectively. Each worker has one unit of indivisible labor for sale, and each ®rm seeks to buy one unit of labor. There are two possible types of ®rms (H and L) and workers (h and l). A measure qM ((1 À q)M) of ®rms are of type H (L), and a measure pN ((1 À p)N) of workers are of type h (l). Though p and q are common knowledge, types are privately known.
All ®rms have the same reservation pro®t normalized to zero. The pro®t of a type-j ®rm paying the wage w to a type-i worker is R j (i) À w. I assume that h-workers have desirable general abilities that make them more productive than l-workers in both types of ®rms:
To exemplify, H-jobs may be providing better working conditions or be more¯exible, which may considerably increase h-workers' productivity. L-jobs may involve rather routine tasks where general abilities matter less, which would make l-workers more productive in L-jobs than H-jobs: R L (l) b R H (l). Thus, the following ranking of productivities is assumed:
The utility function of a type-i worker who works in a type-j ®rm is denoted u i (w, j) and is strictly increasing in w. All workers have the same reservation utility " u, 8 with matching preferences similar to (A1): given the wage w, all workers prefer employment in H-®rms; that is, u i (w, H) b u i (w, L), i l, h. Furthermore, hworkers perceive a great difference between the two job attributes. For example, the routine tasks or bad working conditions of L-®rms may have a more frustrating effect on creative and high-ability workers; that is, for a given wage, u h (w, L)`u l (w, L). Therefore, under complete information h-workers must be paid a higher wage than l-workers to accept an L-job. Conversely, the good attributes of H-jobs would suit h-workers much better than l-workers, and given the wage w, h-workers would derive a greater utility from employment in H-®rms: u h (w, H) b u l (w, H). Therefore, given that their reservation utility is the same, hworkers would accept working in H-®rms for a lower wage than l-workers. To combine these assumptions, for any wage wY
The technology and preference assumptions (A1) and (A2) generate a rich class of equilibria in the matching game described below. Using (A2), four minimal wage levels can be de®ned through the following equalities:
The wage " w i makes type-i workers indifferent between working in L-®rms and taking their outside option. Similarly, the minimum wage that a type-i worker would accept from an H-®rm is w i . Since both worker types prefer H-jobs, " w i b w i ; that is, under complete information a compensating wage differential is required to have the type-i worker accept the L-job instead of the H-job. By (A2), this compensation should be relatively large for h-workers.
Finally, I make a simplifying assumption according to which there are gains from matching between ®rms and workers of the same type, but for i T j, the total surplus from a j À i matching is negative:
Thus, incomplete information may have serious inef®ciency consequences because l-workers would like to convince ®rms that they are of type h, while L-®rms will try to conceal their types in order to attract h-workers. Assumption (A3) implies that h-workers would prefer taking their outside options if H-®rms withdraw from the market, and similarly, that it is optimal for H-®rms to shut down if only l-workers are seeking jobs.
10 It is also immediately evident that the usual``single crossing property'' (commonly assumed in signaling models) does not apply here. Only one instrument is available for conveying type information: offer wages for the ®rms and acceptance decisions for the workers. These features stem from my objective to focus exclusively on the informational role of wage offers, their signaling and screening functions in a matching model.
The job market operates through the following stages: It opens with simultaneous wage announcements by the ®rms. The strategy of ®rm m of type j is to post one vacancy and a wage w m j ! 0, 11 which remains ®xed during the matching process. On the basis of these offers, workers revise their beliefs about the types of ®rms. A system of beliefs generated by these offers is denoted { q}, mapping each possible wage offer into the interval [0, 1] . A type-i worker's decision problem consists of determining an acceptance list j i that ranks the ®rms according to the expected utilities corresponding to their offers. The ®rm offering the highest expected utility is placed on top, followed by the second-best offer and so on. All offers that yield an expected utility less than " u are rejected, and those yielding the same expected utility are successively but randomly ranked. With their acceptance list in hand, workers meet ®rms, starting from their ®rst-best choice. This process is assumed to be costless.
12
A system of beliefs about the types of applicants is denoted { p}, mapping the set of all possible offers that receive an application into the interval [0, 1]. If two or more workers apply simultaneously to the same job, the ®rm randomly chooses one and the couple withdraws from the market. Workers who have not been able to meet, or if they meet, not been chosen by, their ®rst-best choice, continue to search according to their acceptance lists. If a worker exhausts his list he remains unemployed and receives " u. A ®rm that meets no applicants shuts down.
13
The expected pro®t of a type-j ®rm can be written as
where a j denotes the probability that the offer w j attracts at least one applicant and p is the revised probability that the worker (selected among the applicants) is 10 Proposition 6 describes such an equilibrium outcome. 11 The superscript m will be dropped when all type-j ®rms make the same offer. 12 This, of course, is a simpli®cation. A side bene®t of the costless search assumption is that it leaves the two-sided information problem as the sole source of equilibrium market inef®ciency, if any.
13 Weiss (1990, pp. 35±41 ) describes a similar matching process with identical ®rms and heterogeneous workers: each ®rm announces a wage and a number of jobs. Firms choose randomly among applicants if the number of applicants exceeds posted jobs. However, workers in Weiss' model can make only one application; hence, weigh wages against acceptance probabilities. of type h. I assume that if a measure f of ®rms make an offer that attracts a measure g of workers, each of these f -®rms meets a g-worker with probability min{1, gaf }.
14
The strategies and systems of beliefs ({w Ã j }, {j Ã i }, { p}, { q}) must constitute a matching equilibrium, essentially a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with two rather natural restrictions on belief systems (see the Appendix for their formal statements).
The ®rst condition is in the spirit of the Cho±Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion. If there is an out-of-equilibrium wage offer w 0 that a type-i ®rm would never make, while the other type j would bene®t if it so convinces the workers that this offer comes from a j-®rm, then the workers must put probability zero on type i when they receive the offer w 0 . This condition rules out equilibria in which all ®rms make the same offer, supported by beliefs`` q`1 for w P (R L (h), R H (h)]'' because such an offer can only come from an H-®rm.
The second condition is that workers' beliefs should not stop an individual ®rm bidding up the wage if it is in its own interest to do so. This condition allows for Bertrand-type competition and will have bite whenever equilibria involve a`1, that is, whenever ®rms expect meeting a worker with probability less than one. With beliefs unchanged at the right neighborhood of an equilibrium offer, workers will place the deviant offer w j above w j in their acceptance lists; hence, this ®rm can attract a larger number of applicants. Note that the ®rm deviating to a slightly higher offer cannot expect to attract workers with better (unobservable) qualities because higher offers would be accepted by both worker types, which should leave the ®rm's beliefs about its applicants unchanged. Except in the range [w h , w l , any offer accepted by h-workers is also accepted by l-workers, and no wage lower than w h is accepted by any worker. Thus, a ®rm posting the deviant (out-of-equilibrium) wage w 0 P [w h , w l must be convinced that any applicant is of type h.
For the rest of the article equilibrium refers to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that survives these conditions. As the workers' strategies will be rather transparent, hence as the ®rms' process of updating their beliefs will be relatively straightforward, I will suppress {j Ã i } and { p} in describing equilibrium strategies for conciseness. Equilibria in which wage offers are devoid of type information are called pooling equilibria, as opposed to separating equilibria where wage offers are clear-cut signals of ®rm types. Equilibria can also be classi®ed according to the informational content of workers' acceptance strategies, as shown in Table 1 : screening for equilibria inducing different, and nonscreening for equilibria inducing identical, acceptance choices. Note that an outcome where one worker type withdraws from the market while the other type accepts some offers is also a screening outcome. In addition to the four possible combinations of types of equilibria, there may be hybrid, or semi-screening, equilibria in which differential acceptance decisions convey no information to one ®rm type whereas the other ®rm type is able to predict accurately the type of its applicants. This can happen only if the ®rms' equilibrium offers are``separating,'' which explains the empty cell at the top right of Table 1 . A separating/nonscreening equilibrium is also impossible because if the two ®rm types offer different wages, thus separate, l-workers and h-workers cannot all be indifferent between the two offers (whereas they should, in a nonscreening equilibrium where acceptance choices reveal no type information). This explains the empty cell at the bottom left of Table 1 .
I present below the equilibrium outcome under complete information (fully observable characteristics). Assumption (A3) implies that only i À i matchings will occur; therefore, in this benchmark case the market can be treated as consisting of two submarkets. The Nash equilibrium of this game reproduces the competitive equilibrium outcome.
PROPOSITION ROPOSITION 1. A unique equilibrium exists under complete information. H-®rms offer w
(1 À q)M; these offers are accepted by l-workers.
Consider the case pN ! qM, which means that h-worker population exceeds H-®rm population. If w b w h were an equilibrium offer, it would be accepted by all h-workers but a measure pN À qM would nevertheless be unemployed. Anticipating this, any H-®rm could deviate to the offer w h , meet at least one worker with probability one, and decrease its wage costs. This yields w h as type-H ®rms' unique equilibrium wage offer. Similar arguments can be used to show that w Ã H R H (h) if pN`qM. Hence, ef®cient matching is obtained under complete information and all the surplus in equilibrium goes to agents belonging to the relatively smaller population.
UNOBSERVABLE UNOBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS ON BOTH SIDES CHARACTERISTICS ON BOTH SIDES
This section studies the matching game presented in Section 2 under incomplete information. Throughout the analysis I assume N ! M; that is, worker population is larger than ®rm population. 15 Let N(H) min{qM, pN} and N(L) min {(1 À q)M, (1 À p)N} represent employment in H-and L-sectors under ef®cient matching. The maximum social surplus is 
Separating/screening Separating/semiscreening 15 The analysis of the opposite case does not present any additional dif®culty. I focus on the case N ! M for conciseness of exposition and because I consider it to be more representative of most realworld situations.
consisting of the surpluses from H À h and L À l matching. The corresponding level of aggregate unemployment is
The market outcome will be inef®cient whenever the actual equilibrium surplus, denoted Z E , is below Z Ã . This happens if (i) some types withdraw from the market and/or (ii) matching of opposite types occurs. The measure of inef®ciency is therefore C E Z Ã À Z E . A few remarks on equilibrium matching outcomes and wage determination may be useful at this stage. Relative proportions of H-to L-®rms and h-to l-workers play an important role in determining the type of equilibrium and matching. For instance, a pooling wage offer is likely in markets populated predominantly by H-®rms and h-workers. The probability of an H À l or L À h matching being low, H-®rms will not ®nd it bene®cial to separate from L-®rms that imitate them. Given the equilibrium type, wages are determined by demand and supply considerations, that is, the ®rms' probability of receiving at least one applicant (which depends on the proportion of workers applying to their offer) and the expected type of the applicants. Bidding up the wage slightly increases the number but cannot improve the expected quality of applicants. Bidding down the wage may be bene®cial if the ®rm does not expect a sharp fall in the number of applicants, which depends on whether there is unemployment at the actual wage and how the workers interpret a lower wage.
3.1. Pooling/Nonscreening (PN) Equilibria. I consider ®rst equilibria in which wages and acceptance decisions convey no type information. The set of type distributions {p, q} for which a PN equilibrium exists is shown in Figure 1 by the shaded area. A PN equilibrium exists in markets populated predominately by H-®rms and h-workers. Because N ! M and all ®rms offer the same wage w Ã P accepted by all workers, there will be unemployment, which bids down the pooling wage until Eu i (q, w Ã P ) " u for i l and/or h. Thus, this pooling offer yields all workers an expected utility equal to their outside surplus. In Figure 1 , the area to the northeast of the intersection of the schedules p H (w P ) and p L (w P ) represents the set S PN of type distributions such that all ®rms at least break even by offering the equilibrium wage. 16 The ®rms have no incentive to bid up the wage because they are already matched with at least one applicant and bidding up the wage does not improve the quality of applicants. On the other hand, no ®rm has an incentive to decrease its offer, for it would be interpreted as an L-®rm. One ®nal condition that remains to be checked is that because there is unemployment, an L-®rm may consider offering a lower wage, signal its type, and attract only l-workers. This will not happen, because the condition q b " q implies w Ã P`" w l : PN equilibrium wage is lower than the lowest wage that l-workers would accept for employment in L-®rms.
16 S PN consists of high q and p values because a high q (meaning the proportion of H-®rms is large) allows for a lower acceptable pooling wage offer (w Ã P is decreasing in q) while a high p (meaning the proportion of h-workers is large) implies that the ®rms can earn nonnegative expected pro®ts by attracting both types of workers. PROPOSITION ROPOSITION 2. If {p, q} P S PN and q b " q, a PN equilibrium exists where all ®rms offer the same wage w Ã P , which all workers accept. Both L À h and H À l matchings occur; thus, a PN equilibrium displays all types of matching inef®ciency.
No wage dispersion is observed in this equilibrium. A single wage clears the market populated by two different types of workers and ®rms. Though all jobs are ®lled and unemployment U Ã N À M is minimal, the PN equilibrium outcome displays both types of matching inef®ciency: a measure (1 À p)qM of H-®rms are matched with l-workers and a measure p(1 À q)M of L-®rms are matched with h-workers. For instance, in the case qM`pN and (1 À q)M`(1 À p)N (H-and L-®rm populations are smaller than the corresponding worker populations), the measure of inef®ciency will be
which re¯ects the surplus that can be generated by dissolving matching of opposite types and constructing the maximum number of proper matching. Inef®ciency of PN equilibrium vanishes as p 3 1 and q 3 1, that is, as ®rm and worker population distributions homogenize toward the high-quality type. Equilibria. An SSS equilibrium involves a pair of distinct wage offers, one for each ®rm type. All workers accept the higher wage offer and place it at the top of their acceptance lists; therefore, the higher wage offer does no screening. By Assumption (A.3), L-®rms cannot make a separating wage offer accepted by all workers; therefore, the higher wage offer comes from H-®rms. L-®rms make the low offer accepted by l-workers only (though ranked below the high offer of H-®rms). Since N ! M, H-®rms cannot obviously hire the entire worker population. Among those who have not been able to match with an H-®rm, (residual) workers of type-l apply to L-®rms while (residual) h-workers withdraw from the market. Two cases arise according to whether the size of L-®rms exceeds or not the size of these residual l-workers. In the af®rmative, the wage in the L-sector is R L (l); otherwise it is " w l . H-®rms' offer is``separating'' and higher, but equal to the lowest offer that prevents L-®rms' imitation. H-®rms take the risk of being matched with l-workers because h-worker population (or p) is large enough (Figure 2) .
17 the following strategies form an SSS equilibrium: (
w l for L-®rms. Beliefs are as in (i).
An SSS equilibrium displays wage dispersion and signaling of a high-quality job through wage premia if the high-quality worker population is large enough. The size of this wage premium depends on market conditions in the L-sector; it is large if each L-®rm meets at least one l-worker, small otherwise. Inef®cient matches occur ((1 À p)qM l-workers are matched with H-®rms) and there is unemployment (of measure p(N À qM) if pN`qM, (1 À p)qM if pN ! qM). The measure of inef®-ciency in an SSS equilibrium is
where X p(N À qM) if pN`qM and X (1 À p)qM otherwise, and Y represents the potential surplus from establishing L À l matches. 18 As expected, the level of inef®ciency in an SSS equilibrium is lower than a PN equilibrium because in the former, H-®rms signal their type, which avoids L À h matches. Thus, C SSS`CPN .
3.3. Pooling/Screening (PS) Equilibria. The matching game has a PS equilibrium where workers respond differently to the pooling wage offer w Ã P : h-workers accept the offer while l-workers withdraw from the market.
19 For h-workers to accept a pooling offer and risk being matched with L-®rms, the proportion of H-®rms must be high (stated as q b q C in Proposition 4). The PS equilibrium wage is determined according to demand-and-supply considerations. If total labor supply pN at the pooling wage exceeds the demand M (i.e., p ! MaN), w Ã P is relatively low. Otherwise w Ã P is high because ®rms will bid up the wage until the offer hits the limit of attracting withdrawn l-workers. Above the locus LL in Figure 3 L-®rms have no incentive to bid up the wage (condition (2)). The region of prior beliefs such that H-®rms do not bid up that wage is given by the area to the right of HH 1 locus, or HH 2 locus, depending on their equilibrium pro®t levels (conditions in (3)). De®ne
u as the wage that makes i-workers indifferent between accepting the wage w i (q) and taking their outside option, and q C through w l (q C ) w h (q C ).
PROPOSITION ROPOSITION 4. Assume q b q C . A PS equilibrium exists where only h-workers accept w
19 The opposite case could not happen because by (A3) R H (l)`w l w Ã P : H-®rms would not make an offer that only l-workers accept.
and either
On the other hand, if p ! MaN, the PS equilibrium offer is w Ã P w h (q). This equilibrium shows that a single wage can prevail in job markets populated predominantly by high-quality ®rms and workers, and the equilibrium wage could be low enough to drive low-quality workers to their outside option. Though l-workers withdraw, they constitute a small fraction of the worker population. For pN`M, a measure pqN of H À h matching and a measure (1 À q)pN of L À l matching occur. The measure of inef®ciency is therefore
This consists of the negative surplus from L À h matching, plus the foregone surpluses that could be obtained by properly matching mismatched h-workers and withdrawn l-workers.
3.4. Separating/Screening (SS) Equilibria. The last possible matching outcome involves full revelation of type information, either through strategies that 
an H-®rm never imitates the higher wage offer of an L-®rm. An imitation in the opposite direction is possible, but ruled out under the conditions given in Proposition 5. Note that perfect matching is obtained; hence an SS equilibrium is ef®cient.
As shown in Figure 4 , an SS equilibrium exists if p is suf®ciently lower than q and if MaN is close to one (stated as (4) in Proposition 5). The relatively low wage offered by H-®rms is not imitated by an L-®rm thanks to a low probability of meeting an h-worker, which implies a low paq ratio. This, combined with a ratio MaN suf®ciently close to one, implies that l-worker population exceeds L-®rm population; hence, L-®rms meet an l-worker with probability one. Note that the SS equilibrium produces the ef®cient outcome. 
an SS equilibrium exists where H-®rms offer w Ã H w l , which is accepted by h-workers, and L-®rms offer w Ã L " w l , which only l-workers accept.
Consider now the second type of SS equilibrium where only one ®rm type and one worker type operate. These cannot be H-®rms and h-workers because L-®rms and/or l-workers would enter the market rather than withdraw. An SS equilibrium in which only L À l matching occurs may exist if l-worker population is suf®ciently large and if workers hold``pessimistic'' beliefs: a wage offer is interpreted as an L-®rm's offer unless it exceeds R L (h), the productivity of h-workers in L-®rms. The equilibrium outcome generates Gresham's Law in the labor market: H-®rms and h-workers withdraw. The wage offer of L-®rms may take on two values, determining how the surplus from L À l matching is shared. The social cost of having H-®rms withdrawn from the market is C SSL (R H (h) À w h ) min{qM, pN}, which vanishes as either q 3 0 or p 3 0. PROPOSITION ROPOSITION 6. Two types of SS equilibria exist where only L-®rms and l-workers operate. If q 1 À (1 À p)NaM and
These offers are accepted by l-workers. H-®rms do not make any offer or make a ridiculous offer rejected by all workers.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This article investigates the role wage offers can play in signaling and extracting information about unobservable ®rm and worker characteristics in a large job market. It considers a market matching game with two types of ®rms and workers: one that has desirable qualities and another with poor, undesirable qualities. Ef®-ciency requires matching ®rms and workers of the same type. In the model, ®rms announce wages, workers make applications, and matching occurs. The article shows that when ®rms and workers are incompletely informed about each others' characteristics, a rich class of wage patterns and matching outcomes can arise, depending on the fraction of ®rms and workers with desirable attributes, the size of excess supply of labor (as captured by NaM), and matching preferences of ®rm and worker types. I summarize below the results and discuss their implications with reference to the literature, followed by some extensions.
(i) Markets with a large population of``high-quality'' workers have an SSS equilibrium in which wages signal ®rm characteristics but job applications do not signal worker types. This is the only outcome if, in addition, the population of lowquality ®rms is suf®ciently large. Better jobs offer a higher but nonscreening wage that attracts all workers. Low-quality workers who have not been able to get a good job apply to the lower wage offered by low-quality jobs, while high-quality workers who do not ®nd a high-quality match remain unemployed. This equilibrium outcome is supported by``pessimistic'' but plausible beliefs, in that wages lower than highquality ®rms' equilibrium offer are interpreted as coming from low-quality ®rms.
The equilibrium wage offer of high-quality ®rms is higher than under complete information; hence, workers who match with them receive a``wage premium.'' The theoretical literature provides several explanations for why pro®t-maximizing ®rms would pay wages above opportunity costs of workers. Weiss ' (1990) explanation is based on the premise that higher wages per se increase output. He shows that the matching market populated by identical ®rms and heterogeneous workers with unobserved qualities and reservation wages has a complete sorting equilibrium where higher-ability workers match with ®rms offering higher wages. Shirking models (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) stress the fact that in many jobs it is prohibitively costly to write and enforce complete contracts that could induce ef®cient performance; hence, ®rms pay above market wages and rely on the threat of ®ring poorly performing workers. Firms may also be paying premia to reduce turnover (e.g., Salop, 1979) or prevent unionization (Dickens, 1986) . I show that a higher wage may be used as a signal of desirable ®rm characteristics when the signal is not too costly, that is, if the proportion of workers with desirable characteristics is suf®ciently large.
(ii) Markets with a large proportion of high-quality ®rms to low-quality workers have an SS equilibrium where wages signal ®rm quality and screen worker types. Perfect matching occurs despite the information problem. The wage structure is the opposite of (i), hence accords with the prediction of the theory of compensating differences: less attractive jobs pay a premium. This outcome arises here from signaling and screening considerations, rather than through self-selection of heterogeneous but informed workers who weigh wages against job attributes. Compensating differentials may be paid even if the differences in question are not observable but have to be experienced.
(iii) If the low-quality worker population is suf®ciently large, high-quality ®rms may withdraw from the market. The intuition is straightforward:``lemons'' dominate the market and drive high-quality ®rms and workers to their outside options. Note that the range of parameters (preponderance of low-quality types) generating this outcome in part intersects with the outcome in (ii).
(iv) Three types of equilibria coexist in a market dominated by high-quality ®rms and workers. The ®rst is the SSS equilibrium described in (i). Second, there is a PN equilibrium in which strategies are devoid of type information: all ®rms offer the same wage, accepted by all workers. Thus, a single wage prevails in this market populated by observationally identical but heterogeneous ®rms and workers. The third is a PS equilibrium in which all ®rms offer the same wage, accepted only by high-quality workers. The likelihood of this outcome decreases as worker and ®rm populations become equal in size. The PS equilibrium differs from PN in that poorquality workers (who constitute a small fraction of the worker population) withdraw from the market.
20 Both equilibria are supported by plausible beliefs. The main intuition behind a pooling wage offer is that signaling desirable job attributes is not worth the cost given workers' beliefs and preponderance of high-quality workers.
21
I close the article with possible extensions of the model. Introducing observable characteristics correlated with unobservables appears to have a predictable impact. The case for signaling and screening will become stronger and wage offers will become more ®rm-and worker-speci®c as the correlation increases. Though ®rms will be able to discriminate between cohorts of workers and vice versa, workers and ®rms of a given cohort will be indistinguishable; therefore, the present analysis remains relevant.
22
I assumed costless search to focus exclusively on information revelation in the simplest way. Introducing a friction in the form of search costs will complicate the workers' problem. Each worker will then have to anticipate the number of applicants and trade off wages against acceptance probabilities. Introducing time dynamics is the most important and interesting extension despite the potential problem of multiple equilibria. 23 In a multiperiod version of the present model, new ®rms and workers with unknown characteristics would join the market in each period, affecting the distribution of unattached workers and vacancies, hence the evolution of equilibrium wage offers. Wolinsky's (1990) model of information revelation through pairwise meetings is relevant here. This extension would also allow one to address important issues such as job creation and destruction.
1APPENDIX APPENDIX
A.1. Conditions on Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs. Formal statements of the two conditions imposed on equilibria, explained at the end of Section 2, are given below in order. 20 Since they produce different matching outcomes, SSS, PN, and PS equilibria exhibit different degrees of inef®ciency. An SSS equilibrium is more ef®cient compared to PN because it involves one less type of inef®ciency, the one that stems from H À l matching. The comparison between PN and PS is not that clear, however. While PS has the advantage of avoiding H À l matching, it has the disadvantage of eliminating the surplus that could be generated by matching low-quality ®rms with withdrawn low-quality workers.
21 Kuhn (1994) provides an alternative explanation for pooling contract offers, based on riskaverse and homogeneous workers' need for insurance against revelation of ®rm types or private information that affects workers' utilities. 22 On the other hand, with more than two types of workers and ®rms, the number of equilibria would obviously be larger: a subset of ®rms may offer a pooling wage while another subset separates through different wage offers; some types of workers may have identical acceptance strategies while others signal their types or withdraw. The analysis of this general case in the present model would no doubt be considerably more complex. See Sattinger (1995) for a different approach to the matching problem with many types of workers and ®rms. 23 In a two-period, one-sided incomplete information model, Laing (1993) studies the feedback from wages that signal worker abilities to job applications in the beginning of workers' careers. A similar effect would be observed in an equilibrium of a two-period extension of the present model. A.2. Proof of Proposition 2. The proof ®rst de®nes the set of wages that both worker types would accept, as a function of q. Next it de®nes the set of prior beliefs such that all ®rms earn nonnegative expected pro®ts in a PN equilibrium. Last, it veri®es that no deviation will occur from the prescribed strategies. I postulate beliefs for out-of-equilibrium offers as q 0 for w`w
, where w Ã P is determined below. Note thatand p p in a PN equilibrium because strategies do not convey any type information.
To be accepted, the pooling offer w P must satisfy the participation constraints of all workers:
Given q, let w i (q) be the wage that makes condition (A.1) binding for at least one i l, h. Also, de®ne w P (q) max{w l (q), w h (q)} as the lowest wage that satis®es the participation constraints of both worker types. The assumption (A2) on the ranking of utilities, combined with (A.1), reveals that as q 3 1, U h (q, w P ) b U l (q, w P ). Therefore, w l (q) b w h (q); hence w P (q) w l (q), for q close enough to one. Recall that by de®nition, w l (q) 3 w l as q 3 1. On the other hand, as q approaches zero, U h (q, w P )`U l (q, w P ), thus w l (q)`w h (q), and w P (q) w h (q). By de®nition, w h (q) 3 " w h as q 3 0. Since u i (X, j) is a continuous function of w, w P (q) decreases continuously in q in the range [w l , " w h ]. We de®ne a lower bound " q for q through
If q b " q, l-workers would reject the wage w P (q) offered by L-®rms (provided they infer the ®rm type) because w P (q) is lower than the minimum wage they would accept to work in a type-L ®rm.
I construct below the set of prior beliefs (p, q), denoted S PN , such that all market participants expect a nonnegative payoff given the pooling wage offer w P (q). To this end, for any w and j L, H, de®ne the function p j (w) through the zero-pro®t condition
The function p j (w) is decreasing in w. The boundary of the set S PN can be obtained by substituting for w in (A.2) the lowest (pooling) wage accepted by both types, w P (q).
To see the behavior of the functions p H (w) and p L (w), let q 3 1 and consider (A.2) for j H. Using w P (1) w l in (A.2) reveals that p H (w P (1)) p H (w l ) P (0, 1) (because R H (l)`w l but R H (h) b w l , such a number p H (w l ) strictly between zero and one must exist). Consider (A.2) for j L, as q 3 1. Now,
On the other hand, as q approaches zero, w P (q) approaches w P (0) " w h , which, used in (A.2), yields p H ( "
To complete the proof, I show below that if p ! p i (w P ) and q b " q, then w Ã P w P (q) is a PN equilibrium wage offer. Workers accept the offer w Ã P for it yields them a nonnegative expected surplus, by satisfying their participation constraints in (A.1). However, N À M workers will be involuntarily unemployed. A slightly lower wage offer will be rejected by h-workers because beliefs are then revised to q 0. l-Workers, too, will reject a lower offer because the condition q b " q implies w Ã P`" w l (accepting such an offer yields a negative payoff). Since N b M, a 1; hence the ®rms have no incentive to offer a higher wage. In particular, H-®rms gain nothing by signaling their type via the high offer w ! R L (h). Finally, the condition (p, q) P S PN ensures that all market participants obtain a nonnegative expected payoff. j A.3. Proof of Proposition 3. As a ®rst step, I de®ne two critical prior beliefs p C1 and p C2 as follows: If p ! p C1 , an H-®rm's expected pro®t from making a nonscreening offer (accepted by all and ranked at top) is higher than an L-®rm's corresponding expected pro®t. This condition yields
The expression de®ning p C2 is obtained by substituting " w l for R L (l) in the numerator of the expression de®ning p C1 above. The level of p C2 is such that the nonscreening wage "
24 Out-of-equilibrium beliefs are speci®ed as q 1 if w ! w increases the wage bill leaving the expected applicant type constant, while an offer w`w Ã H is interpreted as coming from an L-®rm, hence generating negative pro®ts. Finally, workers' application strategies are clearly optimal.
(ii) In this case, L-®rms' equilibrium pro®t is R L (l) À " w l b 0 and just equal to what each expects by unilaterally deviating to H-®rms' offer w Ã H . The condition
] an L-®rm meets an l-worker with probability one. This implies that a wage w L b " w l cannot be an SSS equilibrium offer of L-®rms. H-®rms obtain nonnegative pro®ts by condition p ! p C2 . As in case (i), H-®rms' equilibrium offer is the lowest separating and nonscreening wage offer. j A.4. Proof of Proposition 4. First, de®ne a critical belief q C through the condition q C u i (w P (q C ), H) (1 À q C )u i (w P (q C ), L) " u, i l, h, which implies w P (q C ) w l (q C ) w h (q C ) (see also condition (A.1) in the proof of Proposition 2): the pooling wage w P (q C ) yields both worker types the expected utility " u. Recall that for q b q C ( b " q), w h (q)`w l (q). Beliefs for out-of-equilibrium wage offers are speci®ed as follows:
for w`R L (h), and q 1 for w ! R L (h). For any q b q C , w Ã P must belong to the interval (w h (q), w l (q)]. Consider any w P from this interval. The expected pro®t of a type-j ®rm is a(R j (h) À w P ) where a 1 if pN ! M. The wage w Ã P w h (q) is therefore a PS equilibrium offer: a deviation to w b w h (q) only increases the wage bill (note that beliefs at the right neighborhood of w Ã P satisfy (B2)), whereas a deviation to w`w h (q) is interpreted as coming from L-®rms. Thus, H-®rms will not deviate, nor will L-®rms because q b q C b " q implies w Ã P`" w l (see the proof of Proposition 2). Consider now the case pN`M, hence a`1. The pro®t a(R j (h) À w Ã P ) is positive because w Ã P w l (q)`" w l`RL (h)`R H (h). A wage w P`wl (q) cannot be a PS equilibrium offer because deviating to a wage w P `w l (q), which by (B2) should leave beliefs unchanged, will increase a to one. To see that no deviation from w Ã P w l (q) will occur given beliefs off the equilibrium path, consider ®rst H-®rms: deviating to a lower wage decreases pro®ts to zero, while deviating to a w Ã P is not bene®cial if
which as 3 0, holds for p ! R H (l) À w l (q) R H (h)(NaM À 1) R H (l) À (NaM)w l (q) (AX4)
The ®rst condition stated in (3) implies that the denominator of the expression in (A.4) is positive; hence, the right-hand side of (A.4) becomes negative because R L (l)`w l (q). If the denominator in (A.4) is negative, that is, if the ®rst condition in (3) is false, the inequality in (A.4) must be reversed, which corresponds to the second condition given in (3). Consider now L-®rms. As mentioned above, q b q C b " q ensures that an L-®rm will not deviate to a lower offer. Deviating to w l (q) , on the other hand, yields pR L (h) (1 À p)R L (l) À w l (q) À . This is not bene®cial, because letting 3 0,
as stated in (2). Note that the belief systems are consistent with the strategies. The proof is complete. j A.5 Proof of Proposition 5. Specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs as q 1 for w w l and w ! R L (h), and q 0 for w P (w l , R L (h)). According to the strategies described in the proposition, an L-®rm's equilibrium pro®t is R L (l) À " w l . Condition (4) ensures that L-®rms will not deviate to any w w l . As for out-of-equilibrium offers, an H-®rm obtains pR H (h) (1 À p)R H (l) À w l À if it deviates to w l where, by (B2), q 1 for arbitrarily small. But this deviation merely decreases expected pro®ts below the equilibrium pro®t [(pN)a(qM)][R H (h) À w l ] under either condition given in (5). j
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6. All L-®rms obtain zero pro®t in the ®rst equilibrium. Since by the condition q 1 À (1 À p)NaM L-®rm population is larger than l-worker population, competition bids the wage up to w Ã L R L (l). An offer above R L (l) yields negative pro®ts whereas lower offers are rejected by all. Given beliefs q 0 for w`R L (h), an H-®rm can offer R L (h), signal its type, and attract all workers. However, this yields the expected pro®t pR H (h) (1 À p)R H (l) À R L (h), which is nonpositive because p satis®es (6). In the second SS equilibrium, the condition q b 1 À 1 À p)NaM ensures that a unilateral deviation by an L-®rm to a lower wage w L is bene®cial for all w L b " w l . L-®rms' equilibrium offer is therefore w Ã L " w l . j 1 REFERENCES
